We divide the proofs for Section V into three appendices. Appendix B1 characterizes communication equilibria and provides the proof of Lemma 1 while Appendix B2 derives expressions for the quality of horizontal and vertical communication and provides the proof of Lemma 2. Appendix B3 uses the previous results to study the relative performance of Centralization, Divisional Centralization, and Decentralization when the own-division bias is vanishingly small and presents the proof of Proposition 3.
j (m j j j ), where the message space is M j = [ s; s] : Under Centralization, the decision rules map messages m = (m 1 ; m 2 ) into decisions q 1 2 R + and q 2 2 R + ; and we denote them by q C 1 (m) and q C 2 (m). Under Decentralization, the decision rule for Manager 1 maps the state 1 and messages m = (m 1 ; m 2 ) into decision q 1 2 R + while the decision rule for Manager 2 maps the state 2 and messages m = (m 1 ; m 2 ) into decision q 1 2 R + ; and we denote them by q D 1 (m; 1 ) and q D 2 (m; 2 ). Under Divisional Centralization, the decision rules map the state 1 and message m = m 2 into i for l 2 fC; D; DCg, where l j and l k are, respectively, the pro…ts of Divisions j and k, j 6 = k; given that decisions are made according to q l 1 ( ) and q l 2 ( ). Perfect Bayesian Equilibria also require that the decision rules are optimal for the decision makers given the belief functions. Thus, under Centralization q C 1 ( ) and q C 2 ( ) solve max (q 1 ;q 2 ) E [ 1 + 2 j m] ; under Decentralization q D j ( ) solves max q j E [ j + (1 ) k j m; j ], and under Divisional Centralization q DC 1 ( ) and q DC 2 ( ) solve max (q 1 ;q 2 ) E [ 1 + (1 ) 2 j m; 1 ] . Finally, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria require that the belief functions are derived from the communication rules using Bayes' rule whenever possible, that is, g j ( j j m) = j (m j j j )= R P j (m j j j )d j , where P = j : j (m j j j ) > 0 ; j = 1; 2.
PROPOSITION B1. For 2 (1=2; 1] and t 6 = 0 there exists an integer N ( ; t), such that for all N N ( ; t) there exists at least one equilibrium ( 1 ( ) 2 ( ) ; q 1 ( ); q 2 ( ); g 1 ( ); g 2 ( )), where a. j (m j j j ) is uniform, supported on [a j;i 1 ; a j;i ] if j 2 (a j;i 1 ; a j;i ); d. q j (m) = q C j ; j = 1; 2; under Centralization, where q C j are given by (23) and (24), and q j (m; 1 ) = q DC j ; j = 1; 2;under Divisional Centralization, with q D j as in (25) and (26), and q j (m; j ) = q D j ; j = 1; 2; under Decentralization, where q D j are given by (27) and (28). Proof: We …rst show that communication equilibria are interval equilibria. For the case of Centralization let 2 ( ) be any communication rule for Manager 2. The expected utility of Manager 1 if the headquarter manager holds a posterior expectation 1 over 1 is given by
It can be shown that
This implies that for any two di¤erent posterior expectations of the headquarter manager, say 1 < 1 , there is at most one type of Manager 1 that is indi¤erent between both. Now suppose that contrary to the assertion of interval equilibria there are two states
The same argument can be applied to Manager 2 for any reporting strategy 1 ( ) of Manager 1. Therefore all equilibria of the communication game under Centralization must be interval equilibria. Now consider the case of Divisional Centralization. The expected utility of Manager 2 if Manager 1 holds a posterior expectation 2 over 2 is given by
Again, it can be shown that
By the same argument used previously for Centralization, we can then conclude that all equilibria in this case are, again, interval equilibria.
For the case of Decentralization let 1 ( ) and 2 ( ) be communication rules of Manager 1 and Manager 2, respectively. Sequential rationality implies that, in equilibrium, decision rules must conform toq
where 1 denotes Manager 2's posterior expectation over 1 : It can readily be seen that
and the proof follows as in the preceding paragraph.
We now characterize all equilibria of the communication game. For Manager j = 1; 2, let a j be a partition of [ s; s], any message m j 2 (a j;i 1 ; a j;i ) be denoted by m j;i , and m j;i be the receiver's posterior belief of the expected value of j after receiving message m j;i :
a. Centralization: The expected utility of Manager 1 in state a 1;i is given by
In state a 1;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior That is, communication equilibria under Centralization are equivalent to the constant-bias leading example in Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
From (17), we have that sign(b C ) = sign(t ) = sign(t):
The expected utility of Manager 2 in state a 2;i is given by
In state a 2;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior We now show that sign( we need only show that
The inequality (29) is equivalent to
The maximum of the intermediate term above for given t > 0 satis…es
where the last inequality follows from parameter restrictions that ensures positive quantities. This proves that (29) is satis…ed. Finally, the inequality (30) is equivalent to
By a similar reasoning as before we have that for given t < 0 satis…es
For t < 0 positive quantities is ensured as long as c > s: This proves that (30) is satis…ed.
c. Decentralization: If Manager 1 observes state 1 and sends message m 1;i that induces a posterior belief m 1;i in Manager 2 his expected utility is given by
where q D 1 and q D 2 are given by (27) and (28). In state 1 = a 1;i this can be written as E 2 [U 1 j a 1;i ; m 1;i ] being equal to
In state a 1;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior m 1;i and a posterior m 1;i+1 implying that 
given by (18).
We now show that b D ( 1 ) is always positive and increasing. The condition (1 )= > 2 implies that the numerator of (18) 
In summary, given the independence of Manager 1 and 2's private information, the multisender communication equilibrium decouples into two communication equilibria each of which is equivalent to a sender-receiver game in which the state-dependent bias of the sender satis…es (18). 
Appendix B2 -Residual Variance of Communication
In this appendix we …rst derive closed form expressions for the residual variance under Centralization, Divisional Centralization, and Decentralization. We then prove that these residual variances possess some smoothness properties that enables us to characterize their behavior for close to 1/2. We conclude by comparing the informativeness of vertical and horizontal communication.
Vertical Communication
Under Centralization the communication bias is constant, as in the leading example in Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Thus, for a given equilibrium with n intervals the residual variance of communication
The maximum number of intervals
where int(z) is the largest integer that does not exceed z. Therefore if b C < s 2 the residual variance the communication under Centralization is
and
Horizontal Communication
Under both Divisional Centralization and Decentralization the communication bias takes the form
for s 2 fDC; Dg with
;
We now derive the residual variance for arbitrary b 1 ; b 2 > 0, to obtain (38) below. We will then consider the rate of change of both residual variances as the con ‡ict vanishes. 
with boundary conditions a 1;0 = s and a 1;n = s. Solving this second order linear di¤erence equation we obtain The solution to this quadratic inequality is
It follows that N (b 1 ; b 2 ) is given by
Residual And the residual variance on an n partition equilibrium is
a 1;i a 1;i 1 (a 1;i a 1;i 1 ) :
We next compute a 1;i a 1;i 1 (a 1;i a 1;i 1 ) : From (34) and the size of each interval (35) we have a 1;i a 1;i 1 (a 1;i a 1;i 1 ) = (x 1) [
From the sum of a geometric series
x ki = x k 1 r k 1 x k we can simplify the summation of the previous terms to obtain
To further simplify this expression we …rst note that which, substituted into (37) yields
Substituting this expression into V s n and after some simpli…cations we have
where r = x n . Therefore the residual variance of communication is given by
, s 2 fDC; Cg :
Absolute Continuity of Residual Variances
The residual variance V s ; s = fC; D; DCg ; is continuous in the own-division bias ; although nondi¤erentiable whenever the number of intervals in the most informative communication equilibrium changes value. As the number of intervals tends to in…nity as managers become more aligned with each other, the residual variance has an in…nite number of points of discontinuity in every neighborhood of = 1=2. Nevertheless, the next lemma shows that V s retains certain smoothness
properties that allows us to characterize its behavior in a neighborhood of = 1=2 through the function @V s =@ :
LEMMA B1. The residual variance of communication V s ; s = fC; D; DCg is an absolutely continuous function of 2 [1=2; 1] with a well-de…ned limit @V s =@ as tends to 1=2. In particular,
Proof: The function V s ; s = fC; D; DCg ; is continuous and increasing in and its derivative is de…ned except for a countable number of points. To establish absolute continuity of V s we need to further show that (i.) its derivative is integrable, and (ii.) V s maps sets of measure zero into sets of measure zero (Luzin N property; see Rudin 1986). Since the set of points of non-di¤erentiability of V s is countable it follows readily that V s satis…es the Luzin N property (see Leoni 2009 ). We will now show that @V s =@ is bounded in [1=2; 1], whenever de…ned, and this will establish integrability.
First, the case of Centralization. Di¤erentiating (32) we obtain
where the last inequality follows from the de…nition of N (b C ). Therefore we obtain the uniform
We now show that @V C =@ approaches a well-de…ned limit as ! 1=2: From the previous bound we have
Given that b C = (2 1) ( c) we readily have that
Now we turn to the case of Divisional Centralization and Decentralization. Totally di¤erentiating (38) for n = N (b 1 ; b 2 ) we have 
To guarantee that @V s =@ is bounded we now show that it approaches a …nite limit as ! 1=2.
From the de…nition of
With these limits applied to (40) we have
We now consider the cases of Decentralization and Divisional Centralization. For Decentralization,
we have that
Therefore the limit of the total derivative as the own-division bias vanishes is
which is bounded for jtj < 1. This establishes that @V D =@ is bounded and thus integrable.
We now turn to the case of Divisional Centralization. While in this case we have that
the derivative @D=@ becomes unbounded when ! 
s; l 2 fC; DC; Dg then there exists an " > 0
then there exists an " > 0 such that V s ( ) < V l ( ) for all 2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
Proof: As V l ; l = fC; DC; Dg are absolutely continuous the fundamental theorem of calculus holds (Rudin 1987) and we have that
As all structures achieve full revelation of information for = 1=2, if
it follows that there exists an " > 0 such that
The last claim of the corollary follows from an equivalent argument.
Informativeness of Vertical and Horizontal Communication
Proof of Lemma 2: Proposition B1 derives the expressions for b C , b DC , and b D . Consider …rst Part (i.) of the Lemma. We will show that, for any i 2 [ s; s]; 2 (1=2; 1] and t < 0 we have
That is, the point-wise communication bias under Decentralization is always larger than under Centralization when t < 0. Then, it follows from Chen and Gordon (2013) that a smaller point-wise bias leads to more informative communication.
Given that, when t < 0; b C is constant and negative and b D is positive and increasing, it follows
Since 1 then we readily have that > 0.
We now turn to Part (ii.) of the Lemma. Part (ii.a) follows from Lemma B1 which states that
and corollary B1.
To prove Part (ii.b), …rst note that, on average, the absolute value of the communication bias is larger under Decentralization than under Centralization when t > 0. As shown in Proposition B1, a necessary condition for informative horizontal communication is that 1 2 < 1: Therefore, whenever b D is well de…ned we have
However, unlike the case where t < 0, we could have cases where the point-wise communication bias under Decentralization is smaller than under Centralization. To see this, note that when t > 0;
we have We …rst note that
Since the restriction to positive quantities requires ( c)=s > (1 + t)=(1 t), and (1 + t)=(1 t) > 2= (t + 2) (1 t) 2 for t < p 2 1 it then follows that
If, however, t > p 2 1, then for close to 1=2 we can have
is increasing in j the existence of a state j where 
Since both Centralization, Divisional Centralization and Decentralization achieve …rst best performance for = 1=2, if lim !1=2 @ s D =@ > 0 it follows that there exists an " > 0 such that s ( ) > D ( ); 2 (1=2; 1=2 + "):
The case lim !1=2 @ s D =@ < 0 follows similarly from an equivalent argument.
The previous analysis showed that vertical communication is more informative than horizontal communication under Decentralization whenever t < 0. We now show that this communication advantage may be su¢ cient for the organization to move to a centralized structure even for a vanishing small con ‡ict.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we show that
That is, to a …rst order, there are no di¤erences between Centralization and Divisional Centralization for a vanishingly small con ‡ict of interest. In particular, this implies that Using the limits (39) and (41), the previous inequality translates into 8 9 s 2 t 2 1 t 2 3(1 t)
which can be written as s c < 3(1 t) (2jtj t 1)) 2jtj :
For t > 0 this condition is never satis…ed. If t < 0 we can solve for t to obtain that Centralization dominates Decentralization when t < t with t = 1 9 3 s c r ( s c ) 2 6 s c + 36 :
